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The Jean Monnet Chair
The Jean Monnet Chair was created in 1988 by decision of the Academic 
Council of the European University Institute, with the financial support of 
the European Community. The aim of this initiative was to promote studies 
and discussion on the problems, internal and external, of European Union 
following the Single European Act, by associating renowned academics and 
personalities from the political and economic world to the teaching and 
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International Authority and Professions 
The State Beyond the Nation-State
Louis H. Orzack*
I
The analyses that follow explore ways in which the growth of interna­
tional authority and the expansion of links among economies affect the 
structures of professions at national levels. Systems for sustaining 
patterns of professional practice, for regulation of professions by public 
bodies, for defining activities of groups representing practitioners and 
for establishing and maintaining educational arrangements required for 
access to practice, are commonly assumed to develop and remain in 
national isolation.
Along with growth in market participation by multi-national corpora­
tions, the growth in orbits of action of international authorities 
constrains and impinges upon the insularity of professions. The 
expanding presence of supranational and international public authorities 
will without doubt increasingly change contemporary structures of 
professions. The European Community, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development (OECD), and the multinational GATT 
negotiating structure exemplify this trend. Regional trade agreements 
such as the Canada-US Trade Treaty and the current Canada-US- 
Mexico negotiations intended to create a North American regional 
counterpart to the European Community also presage changes in the 
national isolation of professions. United Nations agencies such as the 
World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the 
Center on Transnational Corporations, and the Conference on Trade 
and Development must also be mentioned, as should the World Bank.
Louis H. Orzack, Rutgers University, Boston; Jean Monnet Professor, European 



























































































The significance for professions of the internationalizing of economies 
and of authority has commonly been overlooked. These presentations 
seek to fill that gap and to entice further study of this phenomenon so 
strikingly characteristic in this era.
II
While professions and bodies representing them respond to the 
internationalizing of the world economy, professions are not equally 
engaged in the international locking together of the world’s societies. 
Some organizations that represent professions have been well aware of 
international public authorities, the intertwining of world economies, 
and the further expansion of industrial links. Others continue with more 
parochial concerns and with predominantly local issues. Much more 
study will have to occur to identify the structural characteristics, 
impelling circumstances, and consequent courses of action that 
distinguish between these categories.
This interim analysis concentrates on the spans and intensities of 
relationships of professions with public authority. It exploits the 
following data sources: first, a wide range of professions, second, diverse 
structures of these professions, third, distinctive systems of public 
authority, fourth, different modes of contact between professional 
bodies and organizations possessing public authority, and, fifth, varieties 
of activities and ideas exchanged between these professions and 
international organizations. Such a comparative approach permits a 
multi-dimensional analysis of interest group efforts by various kinds of 
professional associations as they intersect and interact with 
supra-national, multi-national, and national systems invested with public 
authority.
The comparative approach utilized in this project examines the 
patterns of activities among (a) various national governments, 
supra-national, and multi-national public bodies, and (b) diverse 
professions, different components of professions, multi-national 
networks among professions, and national structures linking professions. 
A scope of such breadth extends over different structures of both 
government and professions. This respects but amplifies Rueschemeyer’s 
stricture that “...comparison is indispensable for understanding the 
professions’ position in [a] ... country precisely because nationally 





























































































Inclusion of supra-national and multi-national public bodies and 
professional groups introduces even newer dimensions necessary for 
understanding how professions and public authority intersect. An 
orienting assumption is that various forms of government and of other 
organizations wielding public authority link with professions in distinc­
tive fashions. Only comparative study can specify when and how this 
occurs. Otherwise, little can become known about professional 
structures and their relations with governmental as well as 
non-governmental systems of public authority, and with supra-national 
and multi-national public bodies, whether possessed of sovereignty or 
not (Averyt, 1975).
The comparative endeavor advocated here calls for analysis, first, of 
ways in which professions and government intersect within different 
kinds of national domains. Professions or government or both can 
initiate and focus attention upon such key substantive topics as scope 
of work activities, control of entry, elements of education, licensing 
requirements, client access, and modes of payment. Some professions 
do not desire government sanction of claims to authority and may resist 
approval of mandates. Market factors may dominate and government 
play only a limited role. Elsewhere, government action may be precondi­
tions for professional undertakings. Such diverse patterns include 
co-existence, sanction, restriction, subordination, or dominance, patterns 
that can not be assumed as universal on any a priori basis.
A second objective concerns whether and why professions act sepa­
rately, jointly, in parallel, or collectively in their approaches and 
responses to government and to public authority. This goes beyond 
matters of substance and of links between professions and government. 
It extends to analysis of conditions prior to isolation, to concerted 
action by professions, or to corporatism. It allows comparison with 
industries and unions for which similar action routes exist. Extrapolation 
from single domains is at least foolhardy.
A third objective is cross-national examination of interactions in 
diverse authority systems, auspices for work, educational systems, and 
professional structures. Generalizations derived otherwise, from studies 
of single societies and a restricted number of specialties, will yield 
erroneous results.
Fourth, the extent of diffusion of systems through movement or 
migration of specialists, practitioners, educators, or clients, the move­
ment of information allowing transfers of technology, of concepts and 
norms of practice, and of patterns of ethics, and the initiatives of 




























































































A fifth objective concerns the consequences for professions that 
follow from the development of international and regional organizations 
with varying kinds of authority. The European Community, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, World Bank, World Health Organiza­
tion, and UNESCO come quickly to mind as bodies likely to include 
professions and their services within their mandates.
Ill
At the November 1991 UK/EEC conference in London on mutual rec­
ognition of professional qualifications, diversity in affiliations, structures, 
and actions that characterize associations of practitioners of professions 
across the array of the 12 member states of the European Community 
(EC) were identified as major problems (UK Department of Trade and 
Industry, Proceedings, 1991). All professions, it was stated, are practiced 
differently and have varying domestic regulations. Various representa­
tives of national regulatory bodies, of professional associations, and of 
national co-ordinators reported difficulties in finding equivalent groups 
in any other member state. The paucity of links among equivalent 
bodies in the different countries was also noted.
This ignorance and uncertainty about possible differentials in features 
of professions in the Community’s member states includes the capabili­
ties of qualified specialists coming from other member states; their rights 
to practice; the expectations of others about competencies and skills of 
specialists; the educational processes through which abilities are 
acquired and appraised; the rigor, nature, and duration of supervision 
during preparatory practice; and the existence as well as nature of 
assessment procedures that evaluate mastery of skills (Neave, 1984).
Professions and political processes in relation to international 
authority have generally been overlooked in recent scholarly literature. 
Dominik Lasok’s analysis of the Treaty framework for the professions 
(1991) and Julia Laslett’s review of Community actions concerning the 
mutual recognition of diplomas (1990/1) both refer to political processes 
that affect these matters. Neither authoritative account reviews the 
interactions of professional bodies with various European Community 
institutions during the many years of their concern. Each author avoids 
all but cursory references to such issues. Lasok and Laslett unfortu­
nately overlook important sources vital for analyses of political 
processes that affect relations between professions and international 




























































































various nations are the institutional component generally considered by 
these and other authors.
Review of bibliographical entries and of the texts created by them 
demonstrates that the following sources are not exploited in their work: 
(1) national professional bodies: (a) direct contact through interviews 
and observations at conferences; (b) association newsletters and jour­
nals; (c) data bases utilized and created by associations; (d) press 
releases and documentation furnished to the public; and (e) conference 
proceedings and presentations; (2) international liaison committees 
linking: (a) national associations of practitioners; (b) educational groups 
both faculty and students; and (c) educational bodies such as university 
rectors; (3) national governments: (a) annual reports; (b) monographic 
documents and reports; (c) legislative debates and committee reports; 
and (4) EC institutional documents issuing from the largely undercited 
European Parliament and Economic and Social Committee in addition 
to frequently cited materials from the Commission and the European 
Court of Justice.
Key actors outside EC institutions constitute likely sources of 
significant information concerning professions and their services. They 
come from various sectors. Foremost among them are producer and 
service suppliers, both national and multinational, industrial federations, 
and the international federations of national associations. Consumer 
organizations frequently seek to play a vital part in policy influencing. 
Further, government regulatory and licensing boards comprise another 
involved sector. To this must be added government ministries and 
departments for health, social services, finance, insurance, education, 
trade, transport, energy, and environment. Finally, coverage within the 
trade press and within professional, scientific, and industrial journals 
often reports developments, identifies issues, trends and problems, and 
contains speculations about future patterns directly tied to professions, 
to their services, and to practitioners.
Lasok for example refers (p. 67) to the “vested interests” of the 
professions themselves and states that these had to be “overcome”. He 
goes so far as to describe implementation of Article 57 as a “continuing 
process, slow and cumbersome”. He attributes this to inertia by 
governments of member states, concerned as they are with domestic 
structures already in place, and to the vested interests of professions 
themselves (Lasok 59, 67). In no way does he otherwise explicate this. 
He does not specify how, in what ways and through which methods, can 
inertia of governments and vested interests of professional bodies 
combine to produce static situations. He does not suggest or imply that 




























































































ment of policy. He does not refer in citations to frequent and continu­
ing interventions and actions undertaken by individual professional 
bodies with Community institutions during consideration of draft 
sectoral Directives. Nor does Lasok refer to efforts by professional 
bodies in connection with enactment or implementation of the recently 
approved General Systems Directive.
Lasok leaves open the question of whether more progress is likely to 
occur with the new approach built into the General Systems Directive 
(EC 89/48, 21.12.1988, OJ 1989, L19 24.1.89). This covers all remaining 
fields of work by professionals where no sectoral Directives exist, 
provided the practitioners achieve extensive specialized qualifications. 
It rests on the principle of mutual recognition of qualifications. 
Preparation of the draft text for this Directive occurred without the 
kind of overt consultation with interested bodies, either national, multi­
national, or international, that marked consideration of sectoral 
Directives.
Implementation and enforcement of provisions of this Directive may 
set new records for compliance and speed but that remains visionary 
and quite uncertain. The Directive’s terms enlist participation by 
professional bodies from private sectors of member states as well as 
public regulatory and licensing boards. Enforcement of provisions of 
national implementing legislation becomes their obligation. Considered 
initially as vested interests, they are now to be coopted into a system 
that promises to open access to professional roles across the board. This 
will be well worth continuing study.
Julia Laslett in her review of the Community’s efforts with the mutual 
recognition of diplomas states that progress has been slow “largely due 
to the huge complexity involved in harmonizing occupational qualifica­
tions” (p.l). In specifying what she identifies as “characteristics of the 
professions”, Laslett lists training, ethical standards, and a direct client- 
practitioner relationship. With but one exception, she avoids mention 
of the elaborate system of professional associations and educational 
groups that maintain close contact with Community efforts to deal with 
professions. Laslett refers in a single sentence to the Standing Commit­
tee of Doctors in EEC (p. 10) and then to the “various bodies which 
represent the interests of the professions”. She mentions “... a large 
number of European liaison committees for separate professions, 
composed of the associations representing the profession at European 
level” but states without clarifying detail that “these committees 
participate at a fairly early stage in the proposals,...” She adds only that 
“...those representatives of the profession sitting on the Economic and 




























































































complete” (p. 12). Her short reference to the October 1973 “hearing” 
known elsewhere as the Doctors Hearing indicates that representatives 
of all interested parties participated (p.13). This was an unprecedented 
conference, organized by Ralf Dahrendorf, then a Commission member, 
which a large number of representatives from various professions and 
educational groups drawn from all EC member states attended.
Laslett briefly mentions the European Secretariat of the Liberal, 
Independent and Social Professions (SEPLIS) but does not describe it 
or its activities. An international network of professional bodies, dating 
to the 1970’s and still in existence, SEPLIS receives support from a 
number of the international specialty liaison committees mentioned 
above and from various federations of practitioner associations that 
have developed in some nations. EC proposals for sectoral Directives 
have been its particular concern. While not universally supported within 
professions in Europe, SEPLIS has been recognized by the EC 
Economic and Social Committee as a non-governmental body. It 
organized an assembly of professional bodies to protest OECD efforts 
to encourage governments to reduce or eliminate anti-competitive 
barriers to professionals’ services. This will be discussed below.
A difficult question for those interested in analysis of professions 
and international public authority concerns distinctions between those 
professions for which draft Directives were finally approved by the 
Council and those for which draft Directives died somewhere in its 
enactment processes. If the Community’s Architects Directive was the 
worst case, requiring more than a decade and a half of discussions and 
negotiations before final approval, it did nonetheless move along 
(EC85/384, 10.16.85, OJ 1985, L223/15).
So did a half dozen other sectoral Directives applicable individually 
to medical doctors, nurses, dentists, veterinary surgeons, midwives, and 
pharmacists (EC75/363, 16.6.75, OJ 1975, L167/14; EC77/453. 27.6.77, 
OJ 1977, L176/8; EC78/687, 25.7.78, OJ 1978, L233/10; EC78/1027, 
18.12.78, OJ 1978, L362/7; EC 80/155, 21.1.80, OJ 1980, L 33/8; 
EC85/432, 16.9.85, OJ 1985, L253/37). These pertain to the rights of 
establishment and of provision of services as well as the mutual 
recognition of diplomas for qualified practitioners wishing to migrate or 
offer services, providing they are nationals of an EC member state and 
qualified in a member state. A sectoral Directive limited to the right of 
lawyers to provide services was approved by the Council of Ministers 
(EC 77/249, 22.3.77, OJ 1977, L78/17).
A good deal of effort by the Commission, by other EC institutions, 
and by governments was devoted to preparation and examination of 




























































































formed by national practitioner groups provided venues for extensive 
discussions among national associations and between the committees 
representing them and the Commission. National groups sought entrée 
to policy making by governments of member states through direct con­
tact and communication with ministers and lower level administrators.
These bodies realized that potential Community actions could best be 
dealt with through cross-national communication with counterpart 
organizations. They could then exchange views during evaluation of 
Community proposals, seek consensus, and perhaps undertake collective 
action. They hoped jointly to develop more effective strategies to 
influence Commission policy and later Council action. These might 
include similar and simultaneous actions within member states or 
interventions with the several Community institutions. The Commission 
certainly continued as a prime point of contact for such liaison 
committees complemented by efforts directed at the Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee. Their development was also encour­
aged by the Commission itself, seeking a single point of contact in each 
field.
How can the failure of proposals for engineers, opticians, physiother­
apists, accountants, psychologists, librarians, surveyors, and a host of 
others be explained? Draft Directives for some of these came close to 
enactment. For some professions — engineers and physiotherapists in 
particular — expectations that sectoral Directives would be enacted 
were widely held but were never fulfilled. Why the Community found 
it possible to reach closure for particular professions and not for others 
remains an intriguing question, one for which ready appraisals are not 
conclusive. Why some professions and not others? Why did some fields 
initially prove intractable or, alternatively, why did Community decision 
makers not give them priority attention? Further study is required for 
definitive answers (Crayencour, 1982).
Analysis of professions and international authority within the 
framework of the Community must start with the drafting and delibera­
tive processes that ended either with enactment of various sectoral 
Directives or with the non-enactment of Directives drafted for such 
fields as opticians, engineers, and physiotherapists. After approval of 
sectoral Directives, the stage was set for enactment of implementing 
legislation in each member state. These would designate national bodies 
with appropriate enforcement powers. At the level of the Community, 
Advisory Committees on Training and, for certain fields, the Senior 
Committees on Public Health were created. These lengthy legislative 




























































































professional groups at national and multi-national levels (Royal College 
of Nursing, 1977; EUROVET 1975).
The third stage, the General Systems Directive, was enacted largely 
without input from or participation by professional bodies. The 
Directive was drafted without input from liaison committees of 
professions. Such contacts were purposely avoided despite objections 
from professions. The Commission followed this exclusionary policy on 
the basis of its experience with protracted discussions and lengthy 
negotiations prior to enactment of sectoral Directives.
The White Paper and Single Act called for preparation of a directive 
creating a general system and mutual recognition of diplomas followed 
by implementation through member state legislation as well as enforce­
ment mechanisms. For each specialty in each member state, a particular 
professional body, whether a private sector practitioner group or a 
public regulatory/licensing board, will be designated by the member 
state’s government as the authority with competence in its field of 
practice. Within a government ministry deemed appropriate in each 
member state, a designated national coordinator will seek to ensure 
progress by the various competent authorities toward implementation 
of the General Systems Directive. These coordinators monitor imple­
menting efforts and actions of associations or boards identified as 
competent authorities. The effectiveness of this broad approach will be 
tested within the next few years.
The drafting of the General Systems Directive occurred behind the 
shield of closed doors, in camera. Liaison committees that provide the 
vehicle for professions jointly to maintain contact with the Commission 
and other EC institutions were basically excluded from the process of 
its preparation. A number of professional associations wanted an 
exception in their own case and have clamored for drafting of a sectoral 
Directive for their individual profession. Accountancy and engineering 
bodies are examples. The tables at least now appear turned and the 
earlier suggestion that professions generally resist coverage of their 
affairs by Community legislation appears over-simple.
Remaining questions implied in the recent analyses by Lasok and 
Laslett are the following: When and how is government inertia 
overcome? What will change the level and effectiveness of so-called 
vested interests of professional groups? How much effectiveness can 
realistically be expected from the Community’s new approach embodied 
in the General Systems Directive which relies on the mutual recognition 
of higher education diplomas awarded upon completion of specialized 




























































































Each member state is directed to appoint national co-ordinators, 
within whatever government ministry it deems appropriate, to deal with 
those designated as competent authorities in the various professions in 
its domain. Will this approach realistically open national markets to 
entry of specialists from other EC member states? The emphasis upon 
mutual recognition by member states is, according to a recent appraisal,
...opposed to the traditional right of individual States to control the education of 
citizens and residents and to regulate the professions...; it limits the power of the 
State to check and evaluate all the qualifications of the other Member States. 
(Zilioli, 61-62).
How much change in educational qualifications, regulatory processes, 
and peer structures will result from the General Systems Directive is 
uncertain. Professional groups, government regulators, and educational 
bodies will have to become more amenable, more flexible, in adjusting 
as host country receivers charged with screening applicants from other 
countries. The overall thrust toward internal market liberalization during 
1992 and beyond will indisputedly induce changes in professions. What 
is unclear however is the pace of change in different specialties and the 
extent of change in their diverse structural components.
As one examines professions, acknowledgement of diversity in govern­
mental regulatory arrangements concerned with access to professional 
activities and in the organization of professional bodies becomes ever 
more pressing. In the Netherlands, for example, advocaten have no mo­
nopoly in the offering of legal advice and experience competition from 
many other groups. The engineering profession is not regulated in Den­
mark: anyone can become established and work as an engineer. Danish 
professional organizations are strictly private. No one must join an 
association to qualify to practice a profession. Accordingly, such groups 
are likely to have limited influence and to have restricted sanctions. 
Then, how can they evaluate experience and qualifications of applicants 
from other EC member states where other organizational patterns 
prevail. In those other countries, a regulatory component of government 
or a recognized association of practitioners, once identified as the 
competent authority, will decide upon entry to practice of persons with 
qualifications that have no imprimatur from a public body in countries 
of origin. Regulation found in one country may not exist elsewhere.
Further, what is regulated is not uniform, given diverse histories of 
relationships between professions and government in different countries. 
The UK Law Society representative at the November 1991 conference 
in London pointed out that the Law Society is “...a self-regulating, self- 




























































































look to the EC for advice on complying with legislation any more than 
it would from the UK government. If it needed advice it would take 
independent legal advice” (Department of Trade and Industry, Mutual 
Recognition, 34). This must be contrasted with continental arrange­
ments where regulatory bodies such as ordres are subordinate units in 
government ministries.
Other variants to public regulation exist, some examples of which are; 
title restrictions in offering services to the public, control of competition 
among practitioners, requirements for membership in practitioner 
associations, limitations on numbers of entrants either to educational 
programs or to practice itself, as well as fee schedules and arrangements 
for reimbursements, subsidies, or insurance payments. Implementation 
of free movement for qualified professionals will require reconciliation 
of such disparate arrangements, whether through harmonization or 
mutual recognition by member states.
A provocative and controversial speculation expressed at the 1991 
London conference was that “eventually” European professional 
institutions will be established to replace national structures (UK 
Department of Trade and Industry, Mutual Recognition, 36). A some­
what similar proposal was also put forth a few months ago in a draft 
text of the Annex on Professional Services for use in GATT negotia­
tions on a Framework Agreement. This called for Contracting Parties 
or governments to create what was identified as a Professional Services 
Body (PSB) to oversee implementation of the terms of the Annex 
(Coalition 4). This entity would presumably deal with all professions in 
all countries with regard to national barriers to trade in services and 
national restrictions to entry or access to professions. Its interest would 
include national and sub-national legislation and regulations that could 
restrict trade in services. If established, the PSB would be advisory to 
the GATS Council, hence presumably created by it rather than by 
members of professions or by groups representing them. The potential 
for substantial resistance by professions, either at national or 
international levels, to the creation, mandate, and operations of such a 
PSB is manifest.
PSB would be expected somehow to reach definitive, consensual 
conclusions applicable cross-nationally on such key matters as defini­
tions of the scope of services; the range and substance of national 
government authority; distinctions between licensed and unlicensed 
activities; use of professional titles; research necessary to determine 
spheres for didactic education, practical experience, and ethical norms; 
recognition of international groups promulgating standards; recognition 




























































































levels; linkages of national regulators and ombudsmen; and appeal 
procedures. It seems certain that any evaluations and analyses expressed 
on these critical matters by a PSB would elicit controversy and disparate 
views from the cohorts of professionals.
IV
Professional services constitute an increasingly large component of 
resource exchange within the world economy. Services offered or 
furnished by individual practitioners and by formalized groups of 
practitioners exist within such sectors as health, legal and judicial 
processes, education, science, technology, artistic and design efforts, 
military activities, tele-communications, insurance, and finance. These 
sectors include economic transactions where specialized services, trust, 
highly qualified personnel, and focussed skills link dependent consum­
ers, either individuals or groups, with practitioners, either individuals or 
groups (Bressand and Nicoliadis, 1990).
The spread of international authority and the development of the 
global economy will without question affect the stature and stability of 
professions. With growth in global interdependency through penetration 
of markets by multinational firms, rising numbers of mergers and 
acquisitions, relocations of qualified personnel, and widening and 
accelerating reliance On electronic data storage and processing systems, 
transfer of knowledge across national borders becomes more prevalent. 
Policy making by national governments and actions of practitioner 
groups within national jurisdictions are exposed to events and processes 
associated with international and multinational institutions (Lehmbruch 
and Schmitter, 1982). Such exposure implies vulnerability as well as 
response and both will be discussed.
International structures of authority and international economies have 
developed in the modern world and affect the structures of professions. 
Multi-national corporations organize and coordinate services of profes­
sional specialties in entering and exploiting markets. Whether in 
response to that, or to the strengthening and more frequent presence 
of international and multi-national public authorities, or to the 
spreading and sharing of markets in different political jurisdictions, the 
growth of new structures that link together national professional bodies 
is increasingly evident (Berger, 1981). As interest groups on the 
international scene, these linking structures acquire information and 
share it among member associations, provide venues for the shaping of 




























































































bodies, and seek support for proposals within domestic or national 
settings (Miranti, 1986).
Agreements reached among governments and actions by international 
organizations exercising public authority often stimulate efforts of 
international liaison committees and networks of national groups of 
practitioners. Other origins exist as well. Linkages in professions occur 
as professions seek to provide services across national borders. Entry 
into world markets requires interconnections across national boundaries 
among groups of professionals marketing services cooperatively in 
various host countries. Networks that link professions across national 
borders are noteworthy features of this dynamic era.
Governments, regulatory and licensing organizations, professional 
bodies, manufacturing and service-providing enterprises, educators, and 
consumers now confront the provision of professional services across 
national borders. Linkage networks among traditionally separate 
national bodies of professions have mushroomed. Within the European 
Community, international liaison committees have developed for 
virtually every specialty affected by the prospect of draft Directives. 
Further, international networks that cut across professions and link 
parties such as governments and others interested in international flows 
or impediments to flows of services by professionals now exist.
This appraisal of international authority and professions raises 
questions of the following sort: First, how extensive and significant are 
contacts between these structures? Second, are they pervasive and do 
they concentrate in certain sectors of professional services already 
prominent in more than one nation? Third, are they restricted to certain 
regions of the world or to particular kinds of economies? Fourth, when 
do they arise, that is, what are the conditions that contribute to their 
emergence? Fifth, what processes of accommodation, harmonization, or 
mutual recognition occur given existing differences in standards and 
work norms for practice, educational qualifications, and public regu­
latory arrangements, and how can these be explained? Sixth, what 
consequences follow in particular with regard to social, political, and 
economic integration of national societies and with regard to the ser­
vices and structure of professions in this modern era? And, seventh, do 
international networks of professions represent new and possibly stable 
forms, appropriate to the tumultuous ending of the twentieth century 
and likely to continue into if not through the twenty first century?
The tides created by various late twentieth century phenomena have 
for some been seen as contributing to a possible breakdown of 
professions. This is routinely attributed variously to technologically, 




























































































client and patient services, increases in litigation, the rise of 
consumerism, and the spread in orbits of control of large organizations. 
Growth in international markets and in bonds among governments must 
now be added to this standard list.
As venues where services are rendered move further afield from 
venues where decisions are made concerning what services can be 
provided and by whom, bonds between consumers, whether clients or 
patients, and providers become even more attenuated than at present. 
While modern electronic communication modes permit ready transfer 
across vast distances of knowledge considered necessary for application 
to service needs, these technologies simultaneously allow exercise of 
administrative and fiscal controls. These forces impair the autonomy of 
practitioners and of national professional bodies. Knowledge and skills 
derived from scientific study and practical experience will continue to 
grow at accelerating rates in the next century. Demands for their 
application to human and organizational problems will also accelerate. 
A reasonably likely forecast is that accumulations of knowledge, skills, 
and information will be transmitted ever more readily from practitioners 
to newcomers and across national and continental boundaries while 
their application to human and organizational needs throughout the 
global society will rapidly become more problematic.
At international levels, Arkell identified a double set of concerns as 
a core issue for such professions. First is the difficulty of assurance of 
competence through maintenance of standards. Second is the removal 
of discriminatory barriers to entry of competing offerers of services. 
How can consumers be protected in the face of broader and more open 
entry of persons and groups providing professional services who come 
from other places, with other kinds of qualifications, and with diverse 
experience?
These trends confront existing domestic or national restrictions that 
limit competition by practitioners. They are common but variable in 
substance across the spectrum of EC member states. The extent of 
marginalization of alternative medicine, for example, differs among 
them. So do rules that in certain places inhibit accountants who perform 
audits from offering tax advice and prevent opticians from examining 
eyes for vision defects.
A mounting variety of pressures affects professions. Cultural diffusion 
and technological advances beyond the control of insular professions or 
of national governments may influence professions. Among these are 
multi-societal trends toward consumerism and a broadening of liability; 
higher expectations for health, safety, and personal security; reductions 




























































































introduction of new materials, technologies, products, and services; 
increasing trade within global markets; deregulation and moves against 
restraint of trade; cultural sensitivities; security concerns; and shifts in 
levels of public subsidies. A common charge directed at professions is 
that associations of practitioners seeking to develop standards for the 
qualifications of practitioners and for scope of practice may also 
establish procedures to control fees, punish alternatively qualified 
providers, and restrict consumer choice. Actions by professional groups 
to limit provision of services by alternative providers, ban advertising, 
and eliminate price competition reduce the quality of services provided 
to the public at large. They limit public awareness of alternative services 
and protect providers rather than the public (Perkin, 1989).
Originally worthy aims of professional groups in securing support or 
sanction from government become subverted to protection of living 
standards of practitioners, restrictions on entry, mandatory minimum fee 
scales, and bans on advertising. Interchanges between associations and 
government that result in barriers to trade derive in part from efforts 
of associations to enlist the aid of government in efforts to deal with 
such pressures. Arkell argues that “professionals, perhaps especially 
lawyers, can be amongst the most devious in obtaining state backing for 
the creation of barriers, ostensibly for the protection of the client, but 
perhaps also to make their own life easier,...” (Arkell, 7).
Efforts at international levels to break such connections have recently 
occurred. The recent Canada-US trade treaty established distinctions 
between requirements that restrict trade and others related to educa­
tion, examination procedures, experience evaluations, and ethics, in 
particular for the profession of architecture. In reviewing this, Bradford 
(1988) separated regulations and controls applied to (1) products issuing 
from professionals including arrangements concerned with prices, forms, 
effectiveness, and appropriateness and (2) regulations and controls 
applied to producers and providers of services themselves. The latter 
comprise qualifications, quality of work, nature of experience, and 
adherence to ethics.
During recent GATT negotiations, EC representatives emphasized 
that the proposed Services Agreement should apply at sub-national 
levels. For professions, harmonization by all nations of the details and 
main features of educational curricula that could inhibit trade and 
access to professions and of all arrangements with deleterious market 
effects, would be difficult to realize. As an approach alternative to 
harmonization, mutual recognition could require only a minimal level of 
harmonization and recognition of standards for qualifying in various 




























































































nition would fall outside the Framework Agreement, negotiable among 
all nations meeting objective criteria. EC representatives noted that 
international standards, if approached through harmonization, would be 
very difficult, given the wide disparity in national arrangements.
V
This summation reviews recent instances of engagement of international 
and multinational public bodies with professions. It concentrates on 
professions and their services within arenas where international 
authorities, national governments, professional bodies in various 
countries, and liaison groups of professions react to changes in global 
markets. The emergence and implementation of new kinds of public 
policy is at issue. Successes and failures will be outlined.
First, it covers the fields of vision services, accountancy, and 
pharmacists in relation to distribution of pharmaceutical medicines 
within Europe. Flow has the development of the European Community 
affected these areas of professional services?
Second, another international body, OECD, has concerned itself with 
professional services in its participating countries. What is that concern? 
How did professional groups in the far flung nations that participate in 
OECD deal with that effort?
Third, the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations directly includes 
services in its effort to alter barriers to trade. What is occurring? How 
do professions react to these efforts?
Vision
The failure of the European Community to approve draft Directives for 
the right of establishment, the right to provide services, and mutual 
recognition of diplomas for opticians is an interesting negative case 
(Orzack, 1992).
In 1969, the Commission proposed four Directives for “opticien 
lunetier” covering their rights of establishment and offering of services, 
the mutual recognition of diplomas, procedures for acquiring rights of 
access, and coordination. Seven years after the original issuance of these 
draft Directives, the President of one consortium, Groupement des 
Opticiens du Marché Commun Européen (GOMAC) writing for “the 
liaison committee of opticians of the EC, which comprises the national 




























































































Joint Optical Consultative Committee on the Common Market 
(JOCCCM), informed the Commission in Summer 1976 that it
...recently met and arrived at the conclusion that the proposals submitted to the 
Council of Ministers ought to be reconsidered. ...Therefore, I would be grateful 
if the Commission would request that the Ministerial Council return the present 
proposals for further consideration.
The draft was returned to the Commission and no subsequent proposals 
were ever issued. The proposals died.
Throughout efforts by the EC to allow movement across national 
borders of persons qualified as opticians, liaison committees represent­
ing specialties that provide overlapping vision care services continued 
long standing rivalries for dominance and legitimacy. Disagreement 
among the liaison committees of ophthalmologists and of opticians 
heightened. Representatives of national governments voiced disparate 
views and Community institutions reached diverse conclusions.
Subsequent to the 1969 issuance of draft Directives, the EC Parlia­
ment noted that ophthalmologists were convinced that examination of 
eyes was medical in nature. The disagreement rested in part on whether 
an examination by a person using instruments could properly be 
undertaken by someone not qualified in medicine. French law at the 
time forbade opticians from use of such instruments and in any event 
did not allow them to treat children under 16 years of age. In lieu of 
use of “objective” instruments such as ophthalmoscopes, opticiens relied 
exclusively on “subjective” methods by rendering judgements based on 
patients’ verbal responses. This restriction did not exist in certain other 
countries, such as Great Britain.
To clarify the bases of the dispute further, several additional 
observations are required. First, the terms “optician” and “ophthalmolo­
gist” refer to differently educated persons whose acts concern eyes and 
vision. Ophthalmology is a specialty of medicine; medical doctors who 
are not ophthalmologists are usually also allowed to examine eyes and 
provide treatment. Opticians become educated either at universities, or 
in advanced level technical schools, or in apprentice programs. Second, 
the competencies of opticians and ophthalmologists in part overlap but 
also entail behaviors that can be quite disparate. Across EC member 
states, surgery is almost always reserved for medical doctors, while 
national variations exist in the rights of practitioners to administer 
drugs, examine vision capabilities, supply prosthetic devices (eye glasses 
and contact lenses), and provide corrective exercises.
Across the range of EC member states, the combinations of public 




























































































educationally qualified competencies, can differ substantially and 
significantly. A telling example was the dichotomy among opticians in 
Great Britain — dispensing opticians who can neither examine eyes nor 
prescribe and ophthalmic opticians who can do both — Opticians in 
some continental countries could only dispense eye glasses or examine 
eyes in a restricted fashion. Disagreements between groups representing 
ophthalmologists and opticians about their respective mandates and the 
inclusion of consumer costs for opticians’ services under mechanisms for 
reimbursement, subsidy, or insurance became quite common.
National associations of practitioners developed in each member 
state. For opticians, examples included the Association of Optical 
Practitioners — later known as the Association of Optometrists — and 
the Association of Dispensing Opticians, both in Great Britain; the 
Associazione Italiana Ottici of Italy; the Belgian Association Profes­
sionnelle des Opticiens and the Union Nationale des Opticiens; and The 
German Zentral Verband der Augenoptiker. On the medical side were 
the Italian Associazione Professionale Italiana Medici Oculisti (Inc.), the 
German Berufsverband der Augenarzte, and the French Syndicat 
National des Ophthalmologistes Français, as well as others. Four major 
international bodies existed in this field. These were: (1) Groupement 
des Opticiens du Marché Commun Européen, (2) Section Monospécia­
lisée d’Ophthalmogie, Union Européenne des Médecins Spécialistes, (3) 
Joint Optical Consultative Committee on the Common Market, and (4) 
Société d’Optométrie d’Europe.
Their activities included many efforts to shape or influence consider­
ation of the draft Directives through contact with the Commission in 
particular and with other EC institutions. The Parliament’s Juridical 
Committee reported that it received “severely critical” documents from 
ophthalmological organizations during its consideration of the Commis­
sion’s draft Directives. A political debate ensued in the Parliament, 
where representatives of Christian Democrats and Socialists argued 
about the merits of requiring a medical prescription prior to an 
optician’s intervention. However, the Parliament concluded that 
opticians should be authorized to use both subjective and objective 
methods in examining eyes for the purposes of determining the kind and 
intensity of any vision defect and pathological condition that might exist.
A 1970 monograph entitled, Livre Blanc: Le meilleur opticien pour le 
meilleur service dans l’Europe de l ’avenir, a 123 page compendium of 
materials and statements dealing with eye care services and the 
importance of the EC proposals, expressed the views of opticians and 
was widely circulated by them. It ended with the assertion that “...the 




























































































Council of Ministers of the Community and the Members of the Econo­
mic and Social Committee and of the Parliament will know how to 
reach decisions which impose equity as good sense.” A later press 
release stated that “In the ...battle of the European opticians for the 
defense of the integrity of their professional activity and for the 
satisfaction of the visual needs of the public, nothing must be neglected 
which can aid in the manifestation of the truth.”
The negative views of associations of ophthalmologists toward 
opticians and disagreements among opticians’ organizations about the 
merits of the EC draft proposals persisted for many years. In the end, 
failure of the professions providing eye care and vision services to reach 
any consensus concerning whether harmonization of such widely differ­
ent national patterns could occur and their failure to accept the 
principle of free movement for qualified persons led to a breakdown of 
the dialogue. Governments of the member states for their part could 
not resolve the areas in dispute and acting through Community insti­
tutions turned to other professions and other issues.
Accountancy
Accountancy also provides a negative example. Given the great 
functional importance of accountancy in the modern global economy, 
the failure of the Community to enact Directives specifically focussed 
on that profession is well worth examining and explaining. One of the 
more internationally oriented professions, accountancy appears as well 
as one where vocal if partial representatives are neither few in number 
nor reluctant to express views. The trade press is thereby a rich source 
for exploitation.
The field of accountancy has been described in Great Britain as one 
of the youngest professions (Edward Stamp, “Called to Account”, The 
Times Higher Education Supplement, 24.4.81). Legal controls of account­
ancy services differ from country to country. Services might be free in 
one country but might be defined in law in another as part of the 
exclusive mandate of the accountancy profession. Accountants are 
described as “not regulated in the same way in the various countries” 
and therefore liberalization "... will be more difficult” (Fédération of 
Experts Comptables Européens (FEE), 21 September 1990, p. 24). In 
EC countries, the minimum number of years of practical experience 
required for qualification ranges from two in Greece and Italy to ten 
years’ practice with an auditing firm for Germany where persons 
without a university title or diploma can thereby qualify for the 




























































































diversity in the span of work mandated for accountants in EC countries. 
Thus, British and Irish accountants carry out insolvency work, an activity 
restricted in France to lawyers. German Wirtschaftspriifer are forbidden 
to advertise while Dutch registered accountants are authorized to do so. 
A French commissaire aux comptes undertaking an audit may not furnish 
the client with non-audit services although a Danish statsautoriserede 
revisor is fully able to do so (Hegerty, 1990; Trolliet, 1991).
In 1970, the EC Commission issued draft Directives for freedom of 
establishment and freedom to supply services for self-employed activities 
in the financial, economic and accounting sector and for interim 
measures (COM (70) 721 final, 1.7.1970). Significantly, tax representa­
tion, tax advisory services, and auditing activities were excluded from 
the Directive’s scope. The draft proposed elimination of the following 
restrictions found in existing national laws: Germany’s refusal to allow 
foreigners to take examinations for Wirtschaftpriifer, Belgium’s stipula­
tion that only Belgian nationals could practice as réviseurs d ’entreprises, 
France’s and Italy’s requirement of nationality, and Luxembourg’s impo­
sition of a time limit for authorization for foreigners. Registration bodies 
such as ordres would equalize registration procedures for domestic 
nationals and applicants from other EC member states as would private 
professional organizations.
The draft listed a large variety of national qualifications to be 
recognized in permitting the right to practice. Among these were success 
in the German examinations for Wirtschaftspriifer or Buchpriifer; 
registration in Belgium in the Institute of Réviseurs d’Entreprises or in 
the Collège National des Experts Comptables de Belgique; and the 
diploma in Italy either for dottore commercialista, ragioniere industriale 
or perito industriale.
A leading European accountancy journal observed that when the EC 
Parliament and Economic and Social Committee considered these 
proposals in 1970 and 1971, “...the wish was expressed that the 
Commission immediately prepare a draft...on...freedom to establish a 
practice ...in...tax advice, and ... on the reciprocal recognition of 
professional qualifications ... in the field of legally prescribed audits....” 
The journal added that “...preparation of appropriate proposals will 
however, in view of the complexity of the subject material, presumably 
take some time to complete” (“Summary of the Directives ...Regarding 
the Professions...”, Journal UEC, I, 1, 1 January 1972).
Before Great Britain joined the Community, its accountancy profes­
sion “...worked itself into a lather about the horrors of joining the 
Community” (The Economist, July 21, 1973, p. 57). Describing “profes­




























































































...it is the professional qualification in itself by which one’s professional status 
stands or falls. On the Continent generally, ..., the State plays a much greater 
role...and tends to regard a university education as being essential before anybody 
could be considered professional (The Accountant, October 19, 1972, p. 475).
Contending that accountancy standards and procedures in the different 
countries are “uneven”, a former president of the UK Institute of 
Chartered Accountants urged that the EC proposals permit foreigners 
to use earned titles rather than those awarded or granted in their host 
country. He highlighted differences between government registration 
boards on the continent and the private bodies separate from govern­
ment in Britain (Henry Benson, “How to Harmonize?”, Accountancy, 
January 1973, p. 5). Blunt counter criticism of what was considered the 
British claim of superiority in accounting practice compared with 
practice in continental countries was voiced by a leading Dutch 
accountant (A.E Tempelaar, “Harmonization of Accounting Practice”, 
The Accountant, 168, 5121, February 8th, 1973).
As early as June 1972, a leading British accountant reported that the 
three UK institutes of chartered accountants and the Association of 
Certified Accountants were “represented” in the Groupe d’Etudes des 
Experts Comptables de la CEE and its working party, the Bureau 
Elargi. The Groupe d’Etudes previously represented only the profes­
sional accountancy bodies of the original six EC member states. A new 
working party to coordinate the positions of the English, Scottish, and 
Irish Institutes and the Association was also created (John P. Grenside, 
“Freedom of Practice in EEC”, Accountancy, June 1972, pp. 13-15). The 
UK group representing the key accountancy bodies thereby came to 
participate with the continental associations in forming and taking 
concerted positions on EC proposals. At the same time, by itself it kept 
in direct contact with the Commission in Brussels.
After the Reyners and Van Binbergen judgements of the Court of 
Justice in 1974 and 1975, the Commission withdrew the still pending 
proposals from the Council. The Commission contended that the 
proposal needed “...to be completely recast on the basis of the 
directives on medical practitioners....” but observed that obstacles to the 
formulation of proposals to improve mobility for accountants were far 
less serious than those for doctors. It added that obstacles that still 
confronted the Council in pending proposals for dental practitioners or 
veterinary surgeons were also more serious.
About this time, the Groupe d’Etudes sent a “complete new text 
allowing freedom of establishment for accountants....” The Commission 




























































































since 1970 (Commission, Spokesman’s Group, Question 415/77, 
4.X.1977). Sectoral Directives specifically focussed on the free 
movement of accountants have however never been approved by the 
EC Council; the sweep of the General Systems Directive extends to 
these specialists; the efforts of European accountancy bodies to 
persuade the Commission and the Council to approve a separate 
Directive proved unsuccessful.
Other cross-boundary events have nonetheless drawn accountancy 
bodies from various countries into intensive dialogues concerning their 
work. One noteworthy example of inter-governmental sponsorship of 
this occurred in April 1985 when the OECD Working Group on 
Accountancy Standards organized a Forum on the Harmonisation of 
Accounting Standards. This stressed the need for harmonisation along 
international lines. Representatives of national practitioner associations 
and of the EEC Accountancy Group were invited to participate.
The Federation des Experts Comptables Européens (FEE) currently 
represents the profession of accountancy in Europe. It brings together 
34 professional organizations from 22 countries, including the 12 
member states of EC, and claims to represent some 300,000 members 
of the individual organizations. One of its major objectives is “to be the 
sole consultative organisation of the European accountancy professions 
in relation to the EC authorities” (FEE, Panorama, Nordemann, 1). In 
February 1990 and again in September 1990, the FEE organized round 
tables where participants, drawn from national bodies, national 
governments, EC institutions, and various other interested organizations, 
provided a panoramic view of the accountancy profession in Europe, 
reviewed regulatory patterns, and discussed problems confronting 
their profession.
As an international organization, the FEE has prepared texts that it 
asserts support liberalization of the European accountancy profession 
and the statutory audit of accounts. The FEE takes credit for author­
ship of texts of EC draft Directives for accountants since the mid 1970’s. 
It called for the introduction in the EC of a functional title for statutory 
auditing only; and urged an obligatory test for migrants wishing to 
practice statutory auditing.
Discussion within the FEE has brought to the surface debates 
concerning qualifications mandated in different countries for acquisition 
of “diploma” through such disparate routes as direct work experience, 
university or other higher education studies, practice, or combinations 
of these, and whether a professional title could be considered equivalent 
to a university-earned title. A summary of a recent FEE round table 




























































































than an educational title except, as it noted, for “Germany, Denmark, 
the Netherlands, and maybe some other countries”.
In 1991, in a joint Prehearing Brief to the US International Trade 
Commission during its investigation of the economic effects of US 
import restraints, the three UK Institutes of Chartered Accountants 
observed that the mutual recognition or General Systems Directive 
allows EC nationals with accountancy qualifications in an EC member 
state to practise in the UK. The Directive also entitles them to access 
to membership in any equivalent UK professional accountancy body and 
to identify themselves as chartered accountants. No further re­
qualification requirements are allowed, except for deficiencies in the 
length or content of their education and training.
A senior figure in accountancy has strikingly criticized the mutual 
recognition principle embodied in the General System Directive. 
Rutteman (15 September 1991) refers to the “retrograde step” of the 
requirement that accountants confront an examination in host country 
company and taxation law. He argues for recognition of experience. 
Examinations he claims will serve as barriers in themselves and he 
observes a second important barrier will result from host countries’ 
reliance on their dominant language during examination procedures.
Pharmacists and Pharmaceutical Medicines
Community policy concerned with pharmaceutical regulation began to 
take form as far back as September 1963. A detailed study of EC policy 
regarding regulation of pharmaceutical medicines has been undertaken 
by Louis H. Orzack, Kenneth I. Kaitin, and Louis Lasagna, under aus­
pices of the Tufts University Center for the Study of Drug Develop­
ment. An initial manuscript on the Community’s policy evolution in this 
area is in press (Orzack, Kaitin, and Lasagna, 1992). A second 
manuscript in preparation concerns consensus and conflict in formation 
of that policy (Orzack, Kaitin, and Lasagna, in draft 1992).
How have various implicated professions participated in the develop­
ment of Community policy? The outcome of EC efforts regarding phar­
maceutical medicines will have significant effects for many professional 
specialties. Which medicines they can prescribe, which will be available 
without a physician’s order, and which they can administer to patients 
will ultimately be determined at EC levels.
Distribution of medicines is a major segment of the composite of 
services provided by many health care specialists: medical doctors, 
nurses, midwives, dentists, veterinarians, and pharmacists come quickly 




























































































process of policy formation by associations representing practitioners in 
these fields. This would include associations in various EC member 
states as well as the international liaison committees of national bodies.
The EC’s moves to bring about a single market have generated 
intensive examinations of national arrangements for drug approval and 
of many Community efforts in this area (Cartwright and Matthews, 
1991; Hancher, 1991; Kaufer, 1989). Production of pharmaceuticals in 
Europe and elsewhere reflects globalization of markets and interna­
tional ownership. The Community constitutes one-third of the world 
market for medicines; in 1988, EC expenditures for these products 
amounted to $38 billion, 10.5% of overall health care spending. The 
Cecchini report highlighted the special character of medicines, arguing 
that the sensitive issue of human health demanded strict controls on 
safety and quality, and noted further that lengthy and diverse drug 
registration procedures confront pharmaceutical companies.
Development of such controls is fairly recent; indeed, Germany alone 
among the original six member states did not have any registration 
process for pre-market approval of pharmaceuticals until after the 
thalidomide tragedy. The intermixing of public and private interests 
throughout the development, approval, production, and marketing of 
medicines is extensive. Public bodies determine which medicines offered 
to them for approval can be marketed within each country; mainly 
private industrial organizations dominate production of medicines. 
Multinational firms as well as national manufacturers co-exist and 
compete. Many firms benefit from protectionist arrangements instituted 
by national governments, such as provision of subsidies or remission of 
taxation for domestic placement of manufacturing plants. Individual cor­
porations, industrial federations, and the international body representing 
national pharmaceutical manufacturers’ federations have routinely 
reacted to EC accomplishments and proposals, as have consumer orga­
nizations. The Bureau Européen des Unions Consommateurs (BEUC) 
has criticised the safety of procedures for evaluation of medicines, 
arguing quite openly that manufacturers “...may use the least stringent 
national procedures to gain market authorization throughout the EEC”.
Interviews with key persons at associations of medical and veterinary 
practitioners, nurses, pharmacists, engineers specializing in pharmaceuti­
cals, as well as with advocates of alternative medicines yield rather 
uneven descriptions of their roles in regard to pharmaceutical medi­
cines. The EC’s proposals concerning pharmaceutical medicines have 
attracted some attention from professional associations on some 





























































































As early as 1963, the Commission organized a meeting of consumer 
organizations, an industrial pharmacy association, representatives of a 
European wide committee of the medical profession, an industrial 
federation, the secretariat of the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions, and a federation of Christian trade unions to discuss the 
texts of draft directives. Consideration of the 1975 draft Directive 
regarding the manufacture of medicinal products entailed considerable 
controversy (Orzack, 1977; Appelbe, 1981). This created the Committee 
for Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP) and initiated a multi-state 
procedure for approval of medicines for marketing and their free 
movement within the Community. It included an attempt to specify who 
could be the responsible person to supervise quality control of 
medicines in production at industrial plants.
A storm of protest from international liaison committees of 
practitioners with diverse qualifications resulted when the initial EC 
drafts restricted this role to “pharmaciens d ’industrie” who had 
completed a six year university course in France and Belgium. The 
Council’s Working Party and Committee of Permanent Representatives 
considered the issue and the texts finally approved allowed medical 
doctors, veterinarians, chemists, and biologists in the position, provided 
5their university studies included a specified list of subjects. An interim 
proposal listing a required course in “pharmacognosis” drew the ire of 
the UK negotiators who contended this was merely a transparent 
disguise for continuance of the proposal for a pharmacists’ monopoly 
(Confidential interview).
Arrayed against this proposal that rested on the claim of a unique 
competence for pharmacists were many other practitioner associations 
at both national and international levels. These included bodies 
representative of medical doctors, veterinarians, scientific chemists, 
biologists, and chemical engineers. Despite the strenuous opposition of 
pharmacists, the final resolution was to sanction access to the position 
of “responsible person” in pharmaceutical manufacturing by persons 
from any of these fields with a broad range of educational qualifications 
(Orzack, 1977).
As noted earlier, a set of Directives concerned with the liberalization 
of movement of pharmacists was subsequently approved by the Council 
in 1985 (85/432/CEE; 85/433/CEE; 85/434/CEE). A great deal of debate 
among national associations preceded their enactment. In particular, 
these concerned such issues as national differences in the scope of 
practice, the presence of access quotas that if left unchanged would 
handicap foreign qualified pharmacists wishing to establish themselves 




























































































barriers in certain countries to ownership of pharmacies by non­
pharmacists. Differentials continuing to pose problems have recently 
been detailed in a publication in France jointly sponsored by representa­
tives of the national ordre in France, the conference of deans of 
pharmacy faculties in France, the European Liaison Committee of 
Pharmacists’ Associations, the French Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Syndicates, and the French Association of Laboratory Pharmacists.
Variations in a number of institutional patterns were identified in that 
review. One example is the duration of academic studies and practical 
experience — a combined total of 4 years is required in the United 
Kingdom compared with 6 years in the Netherlands. A further 
illustration is tolerance or intolerance of corporate ownership of 
pharmacies — France, Germany, Italy and Spain require exclusive 
pharmacist control while Belgium, Ireland and the United Kingdom 
allow corporate ownership (INTERFIMO, 1991).
The EC’s continuing efforts to formulate and install policies con­
cerned with regulation of marketing of pharmaceuticals have attracted 
renewed attention from national practitioner associations and interna­
tional liaison committees. A noteworthy example was the conference on 
“Le médicament en Europe après 1992”, held in January 1992 and 
instigated by Le Groupement Pharmaceutique de la C. E. Associated 
sponsors comprised the leading consumers’ federation in Europe — le 
Bureau Européen des Unions des Consommateurs (BEUC) — and 
l’Alliance Internationale de la Mutualité (A.I.M.). The program’s 
speakers included the Vice-President of the EC Economic and Social 
Committee, the European Regional Director of the World Health 
Organization, a member of the European Parliament, and the head of 
the EC Commission unit concerned with pharmaceutical medicines. In 
subsequent interviews, key participants observed that industrial interests 
were simply not invited either to sponsor or to participate in the 
program. The rationale was that the interests of consumers and of 
practitioners should prevail in the formulation of public policies 
concerning regulation of pharmaceutical medicines.
OECD, Competition Policy, and Professions
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) is essentially an advisory body, charged with conducting 
research about economic developments and national economic policies. 
An international organization of governments of industrialized market 




























































































policies relating to major economic issues. The OECD does not exercise 
sovereignty over territory or over persons and institutions.
In 1985, the OECD published a report entitled, Competition Policy 
and the Professions, issued by its Committee of Experts on Restrictive 
Business Practices. The Committee’s Working Party on Competition 
Policy and the Professions previously was asked to carry out a study of 
the following: to identify special characteristics of liberal professions; to 
make a comparative study of the legal provisions on competition 
applicable to them in OECD member countries in selected professions, 
including doctors, lawyers and architects; to study, in the light of 
competition policies, the mechanisms of self-regulation by the liberal 
professions; and to examine to what extent certain practices of these 
professions “... are compatible with the ... competition policies of 
Member countries” (OECD, 1985, p. 3.).
The published report recommended that member countries reconsider 
any existing exemptions of professions from competition law embodied 
in government and association statutes and actions. It urged a market 
framework for professions and strengthening competition in markets for 
professionals’ services. It urged governments to consider how best to 
institute greater objectivity in entry processes for candidates, to assure 
broader access for foreign professionals, and to increase competition 
among alternative providers including paraprofessionals. Governments 
were encouraged to enhance price competition among professionals, to 
seek the shift of activities away from the public sector by extending 
responsibilities of independent professionals, to aid competitive bidding 
practices, to reduce reliance on mandatory fee schedules, and to 
improve information available to consumers about professionals’ services 
so as to encourage rational choice among professional services.
United States government agencies did not contact or consult with 
any professional organizations, either while the study was in process or 
upon its completion; the explanation, as expressed in personal 
interviews, was that US policy was well known and that no need for 
consultation existed (Confidential interviews). As a US State 
Department official later noted;
Generally speaking, the Report and its recommendations encourage increased 
reliance on competition in markets for professional services. They are reflections 
of existing US policy. These conclusions did not raise controversial issues from 
the United States’ perspective, since we have been far ahead of most OECD 
countries in applying our antitrust laws and in removing excessive regulatory 




























































































While the Report received no noticeable attention from professional 
groups in the United States, their European counterparts reacted 
extensively. In Great Britain, the government furnished copies of the 
draft report to professional associations and requested their views. 
Elsewhere in Europe, the report “leaked” from the OECD itself, from 
the governments receiving it, and from groups in contact with them. 
Copies quickly moved through association networks, both national and 
multi-national, and detailed summaries appeared in various media.
Intense opposition to the Report’s conclusions developed in Europe. 
A consortium group of professional associations known as SEPLIS 
quickly instigated a Europe-wide effort to respond to the document. Its 
efforts alone assured widespread awareness of the OECD document 
and its conclusions by the heads of specialized associations throughout 
Europe. Comments in response by professional bodies were quite 
negative to OECD proposals. The European Union of Dentists replied 
that the “these texts are ... bearers of real dangers as much for the 
health of the population as for the ... conditions of exercise of dentistry” 
(Favre July 23, 1985); the Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten asserted 
that “it is clear from the report that it has been drawn up by delegates 
of the various countries without sufficient knowledge and understanding 
of the liberal professions”, and that it reflected “...a basic attitude of 
suspicion and resentment against privileges that are deemed to be 
undeserved” (de Lange October 2,1984). Another illustrative comment 
came from the Italian delegation to the Consultative Committee of Bars 
and Law Societies of the European Community. It observed that “the 
report denotes a hostile spirit toward the liberal professions. In effect, 
it puts the liberal professions on the same level as commercial activities 
without taking account of differences between specialized professional 
services and industrial products,...” (Undated statement). Finally, the 
architects’ delegation to the Comité de Liaison des Architectes stated 
that the OECD report “...misses its target by far” and added that “...the 
price of architect’s services [is] incalculable. They consequently cannot 
be subject to competition in a commercial sense of the word” (Draft 
comment, 19.6.84).
SEPLIS quickly arranged a multi-national seminar meeting of profes­
sional bodies on 14 December 1984, held at offices of the EC Economic 
and Social Committee, on “The Liberal Professions and the Policy of 
Competition”. This led to a two day SEPLIS-organized conference on 
24 - 25 January 1985 to deal with the OECD Report directly.
Seventy representatives of professional associations drawn both from 




























































































associations attended the initial seminar in December. A summary aide- 
memoire reported that
By professions, the total was composed of approximately 25% from the medical 
sector, 30% each from the legal and technical sectors, and 15% from business, 
finance, and communications. By country, the participants were from Belgium 
(28), France (18), Federal Republic of Germany (11), United Kingdom (5), 
Netherlands (3) and one each from Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg and Spain 
(Fox, December 8, 1984).
Representatives of associations of medical doctors had never joined 
SEPLIS but apparently believed the issues raised by the OECD were 
critical to their future and attended the seminar.
Criticism of the report was blunt and comprehensive. Among the 
diverse viewpoints expressed at the seminar were the following: the 
authors were assumed to be economists and senior civil servants not 
members of liberal professions, the report mainly reflected influence of 
“Anglo-Saxon law and lawyers”, competitive market policy would be 
incompatible with professionalism, professions already practise competi­
tion between those with equivalent qualifications, professional responsi­
bilities differ from commercial responsibilities, professional codes protect 
consumers in technical matters beyond their knowledge, competition is 
implicit in professional practice, competition in professional practise by 
para-professionals and gifted amateurs would endanger clients, 
competition engendered by lack of restriction upon numbers entering 
professions puts the public at risk, and advertising by individual 
professionals can confuse the public. A member of the EC Economic 
and Social Committee reportedly stressed that the Report reflected 
“...the lack of consultation with the professions, the misinterpretation of 
their roles, and the danger of confusing professional practitioners with 
commercial traders.”
Following this seminar, another and broader meeting was arranged. 
The “European Conference of the Liberal Professions” organized by 
SEPLIS in January 1985 in Brussels was attended by a wide array of 
“...representatives of the national organizations of the liberal professions 
of the various countries of the European Community, the European 
Liaison Committee of the Liberal Professions, and the Organizations of 
the Liberal Professions of the non-member countries of the European 
Community.”
The Resolution issued at the meeting’s conclusion contended that the 
methods to collect data about professions yielded invalid and unreliable 
results. Generalizing to all professions from data gathered about three 




























































































document as not acceptable. It argued that the OECD Committee of 
Experts on Restrictive Business Practices which drafted the Report did 
not consult with those most informed about the matters covered, that 
is, the professions and associations representing them. It went on to 
observe “...independence of practice, renowned and assured compe­
tence, personal responsibility, professional secrecy and free choice, 
require, at the statutory and deontological level, restrictions on free 
competition without which the fundamental interest of the client would 
be endangered.” It noted that competition already exists within the 
liberal professions providing guarantees for consumers, that entry 
restrictions provide added guarantees to clients that would be vitiated 
if para-professionals receive access to activities of liberal professions, 
that practice exclusivity protects clients against services of low quality, 
and that group practice of professional services would depersonalize 
such services and thus “...bring about a serious prejudice to the social 
functions of the liberal professions in modern society” (Resolution; 
UNAPL Memorandum).
The Resolution was sent to OECD by SEPLIS and in a concerted 
effort, professional groups placed it before the appropriate ministries of 
governments in European countries.
“Competition and professionalism simply are not incompatible”, 
asserted the Assistant Chief of the Special Litigation Section of the US 
Department of Justice Antitrust Division in a 1980 presentation, adding,
...the public has the right to expect that it will have the benefit of a competitive 
market for professional services, ... competition will increase the incentive of 
those in the market to improve the quality of their services and maintain their 
fees at a competitive price (Stark, 1980, p. 27).
A key Washington legal official expressed the view that, “although it’s 
not all the same in each profession and in each state”, the competition 
policy embodied in the OECD document is clearly US policy. The legal 
official quoted above reported further that a former staff member of the 
U. S. Federal Trade Commission who became a Deputy Legal Adviser 
at the OECD in Paris assumed a major role in drafting the question­
naire used by the OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business 
Practices and later drafted the published report. As a consequence, he 
contended, no need existed for the US government to elicit reactions 
by professional groups to the OECD document (Interview, Stark, 
August 1986). It appears further that professional groups in the United 
States overlooked the report, were not alerted to it by European 
counterparts, or considered it unimportant. Reactions by professional 




























































































the report apparently followed the intense opposition mounted in 
Europe. In response to the Resolution, OECD contended that the 
report was basically a discussion document, for implementation as its 
member countries saw fit. It stated that the report “...takes fully into 
account the importance of ... the liberal professions as well as the 
consumer’s ... needs.” Abolition of anticompetitive practices benefits the 
public interest and does not threaten quality of services. Its most blunt 
statement concerned the charge that the OECD had not consulted the 
professions during the Report’s preparation. A key OECD official 
responded bluntly by stating: “it is incorrect” (Geiger, OECD, to 
Rousseaux, 27th February 1985).
The presence of an aggressive, central liaison body in Europe led 
many professions there to surmount pre-existing antagonisms and 
patterns of autonomy so as to confront what seemed to many as a 
broad challenge from an international body. A similar structure has not 
developed in the United States, at either federal or state levels. Why 
this OECD report led to an outraged reaction among professional 
bodies in Europe and at best a passive response among similar groups 
in the United States remains an intriguing question. The reasons for 
these differentials await further analysis.
GATT and Professional Services
The Uruguay round of negotiations among governments of approxi­
mately 100 nations represents an attempt to negotiate agreement on 
rules that would reduce or eliminate barriers to trade. This effort 
includes an attempt to liberalize trade in services, to allow for more 
open access within nations of provision of services based in other 
nations and to permit more free establishment of qualified specialists.
Prime targets for change are discriminations applied at or within 
national boundaries especially by means of non-tariff barriers. Require­
ments for special quality standards, licensing criteria, language tests, or 
demands for ‘best country education’ as pre-conditions for practice are 
viewed in the context of these negotiations as discriminatory in their 
effects on service-providers based in or coming from other nations.
Generally, national arrangements and practices, often those resulting 
from intense and lengthy struggles intended to improve status, to 
monopolize areas of work, and to weaken competition, have come to be 
defined as barriers to trade in professional services. These include 
licensing regulations seen as masking discrimination against foreigners 
through requirements for in-country education, citizenship, and testing 




























































































credentials in offering services to the public, limitations on competition 
through advertising prohibitions, and restrictions against marketing of 
services by practitioners not located in the same jurisdictions as clients 
have been defined as protectionist restrictions. Immigration quotas 
based on certification that the numbers or skills of host country 
practitioners are insufficient or are adequate also appear discriminatory 
within the GATT framework.
GATT’s mandate initially concerned international trade in goods and 
products. The Uruguay Round in September 1986 initiated the 
extension of negotiations to include services as vital segments of the 
international economic exchange system. Services by professionals have 
become a vital part of these continuing negotiations and the course of 
these negotiations have come to be a matter to which certain sectors of 
practitioners have paid close attention. A noteworthy example is the 
accountancy profession. In February 1990, the Fédération des Experts 
Comptables Européens sponsored a full examination of the Uruguay 
Round Services Negotiations on the accountancy profession (FEE, 
1990).
The conference brought together representatives of the accountancy 
professions from a wide span of countries from both Western and 
Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia as well as Canada and the 
United States plus administrators from the European Community 
Commission and OECD. The Director of the Group of Negotiations on 
Services (GNS) at the GATT Secretariat observed during discussion 
that the projected Services Agreement would cover over US $1,000 
billion in services trade. Multilateral trading arrangements for goods and 
services were identified as vital elements in the GATT negotiations 
while stress was also placed on recognition that global firms in this field 
are international networks of national practices.
VI
Profession - Public Authority Interactions
Examination of links of organized professional bodies and various 
modes of public authority requires a careful and systematic review and 
analysis along comparative lines. This applies both to professions and to 
public authority. For professions, the ranges of specialties constitute an 
obvious first basis for comparison. Fields for work as differentiated as 




























































































management fall within professional service domains. Their diverse 
components include groups formed from established, specialized, and 
marginal practitioners, non-peers associated in work efforts, educators, 
members of other faculties, students, staff at locales for service and for 
training, staff and members of licensing, regulatory, or registration 
bodies, and consumers.
Structural characteristics associated with the work of specialists 
providing similar services can be quite diverse. Sanctions through public 
mandates and the derived strength of public support can also vary 
extensively. Culturally distinctive patterns, parallelisms and divergencies 
in contiguous societies, continuities and discontinuities in once-linked 
political systems, can further extend the required analysis.
Public authority itself necessitates intensive systematic consideration. 
The state and its powers developed differently through different eras 
and in disparate social and cultural milieus (Rueschemeyer and Evans, 
1985). The creation, maintenance, and behavior of the nation-state rest 
upon composites of political traditions, natural resources, technological 
capabilities, public support, and the ability of leaders and elites to 
depend upon, command, control, influence, manipulate, or destroy all 
or parts of its public bases.
What nation-states thus become affects how they behave toward 
elements of the societies where they exist. Professions clearly are among 
these elements and, therefore, the structure of different nations should 
be covered in any attempt to comprehend how professions and public 
authority interact.
Highly diverse interactions of professions and public authority can be 
identified in multi-national, supra-national, and national contexts. In the 
instances covered above, professions have acted either independently of 
each other, or with some degree and kind of coordination, or through 
diversely formed organizations especially created to represent and voice 
shared interests. Complex structures of both professional and public 
authority come into mutual and intricate contact in the occurrences 
reviewed. Each represents a different form of intersection between 
profession and public authority. The structures of both profession and 
public authority involved, the problems foreseen, the actions contem­
plated, the efforts initiated, the counter-actions that resulted, and the 
results achieved or frustrated, require systematic review. Change, 
deflection, and defeat can all be seen in these complex events and 
necessitate further examination.
As public bodies, these organizations — EC, OECD, and GATT — 
exemplify different kinds of authority and actions. Multi-national and 




























































































on participation and assents from autonomous governments, few or 
many in numbers, which may change through additions or withdrawals. 
National governments range from highly centralized systems of control 
to centers with restricted authority interacting with loosely federated 
and otherwise autonomous, perhaps co-equal, units.
Professions seek to effect change in decisions made by public bodies 
that are deemed vital to them. Their targets include actions of govern­
ments to create, ignore, tolerate, support, dominate, or destroy profes­
sions and their work (Johnson, 1972; Lifton, 1986; Orzack, 1981, 1983; 
Leibfried and Tennstedt, 1986; Light, Leibfried, and Tennstedt, 1986).
While work activities undertaken by professionals are commonly foci 
of concern and targets for action by public authority, they are not 
constant across societies. Every feature can vary, including scopes and 
natures of services provided, selection of and access by potential clients, 
levels of discretion available to practitioners or to their professional 
associations, selection of novices, control over educational requirements, 
rigor in licensing mechanisms, and overall positions of professions within 
society.
The balances between government and professions, balances that are 
themselves quite changeable and quite diverse, largely determine these 
elements of work. Unilateral decisions, government domination, 
government deference, and professional autonomy can all be found. 
Governments may create practitioner associations to ensure control of 
work performed or of behaviors of those engaged in it. Alternatively, 
associations of professionals can arise from actions by persons engaged 
in similar work activities who desire thereby to change policy of public 
bodies. Finally, employers often foster and support development of 
associations of members of their work force.
The aims of these groups includes mutual aid, economic benefits, job 
protection, recreation, political action, education, and public or private 
control. Spans of membership and levels of participation can vary 
immensely.
Awareness of such patterns compels an extensive review and exami­
nation of diverse professions in different societies. Comparisons of 
interactions by professions with different kinds of public authority, 
non-governmental as well as governmental, supra-national as well as 
multi-national, can yield substantial benefits.
Actions Toward Professions
The character of actions by public authority regarding professions may 




























































































or restricting, what professionals do and how they work; (2) to gain or 
maintain support and legitimation of key professions through contacts 
with or control of professional associations; (3) to increase or decrease 
the supplies and distributions of specialists, through changes in financial 
backing of educational programs as well as shifts in licensing standards; 
(4) to sanction or determine the scope, duration, standards, examination 
mechanisms, and significance for entry to practice of education and 
training provided in state and independent settings; (5) to modify the 
work performed by professionals for defined categories of their 
clientele; (6) to alter or control the terms of compensation and levels 
of remuneration; (7) to control and conceivably limit the numbers, 
locations, and working arrangements of practitioners; and (8) to control 
the immigration flows of practitioners qualified in and licensed in other 
countries.
Other possibilities include sanctioning of particular modes of research 
considered appropriate and useful, monitoring of or active participation 
in creation or maintenance of ethical codes, and handling of charges of 
mis-behavior as well as determination of appropriate punishments.
Of great interest and likely to provoke close attention, is the recent 
proposal by Martin Bangemann, Commission Vice President, for 
possible creation of a new and special form of association for liberal 
professions practicing across the range of the Single Market (Commis­
sion DGIII/F/2 Perissich letter, 5 November 1991). Bangemann suggests 
a new legal structure for joint cross-border professional practice and 
currently has requested comments from liaison committees. An 
“audition” or hearing with representatives of these groups was 
scheduled for late March 1992 and will be followed by another 
“audition” where views of national governments will be expressed. 
Bangemann has solicited comments on the merits of single specialty or 
multi-specialty professional practice, on inclusion or exclusion of legal 
persons along with natural persons, on the possible desirability of 
Community-wide rules applicable to practice, on the locus of authority 
for disciplinary supervision where different professions are involved, and 
on the treatment of liability. The idea of joint practice encounters the 
reality that a system of joint practice in the form of partnership is 
“...virtually unknown in continental Europe” while common in Great 
Britain. Nonetheless, the proposal was seen as part of the Commission’s 
desire to create legislation for co-operative practice by specialists in 
professions (Hunter, 3 December 1991). Perhaps the most intriguing 





























































































Groups in professions may represent practitioners, educators, students, 
service-providing bodies, educational institutions, certifying agencies, 
funding entities, licensing and certifying boards. With varying authority, 
such groups may put forth views and urge action on behalf of their 
sector of a profession or of the field as a whole. Only practitioner 
groups will be discussed here. Associations of practitioners in specialized 
fields frequently develop at national levels. Where autonomy of practi­
tioners is prized, groups of specialty associations may nonetheless form 
within nations or their regions so as to permit communication and 
discuss possibilities for common policies. In some countries, many 
specialized associations support national coordinating mechanisms to aid 
review and discussion about such matters as government policies regar­
ding fees, insurance, educational support, and licensing requirements.
International liaison committees drawing together specialized 
practitioner associations from various countries also exist (Orzack, 1992; 
Economic and Social Committee, 1980). These serve as communication 
and coordinating mechanisms for national associations of specialized 
professionals. One group in Western Europe claims professions across 
a multi-national range for its base. Its membership comprises numbers 
of international liaison committees and in addition several national 
consortia of specialized associations.
Professions in some national settings originate autonomously, stand 
apart from government and yet depend upon it for legitimation for their 
work. Competition by differently qualified service suppliers may provide 
the excuse for approaching government to provide public legitimation 
and thus the basis for a claim to market pre-eminence. Government 
creation of licensing or registration systems and support of educational 
facilities and programs are often backed by practitioner groups. 
Maintenance and enrichment of support for qualifying programs within 
publicly-controlled schools at intermediate or higher levels is frequently 
their objective in Italy, Germany, Denmark, France, and other 
European Community countries.
Market shelters built around credentials (Freidson, 1986, p. 109; 
Rueschemeyer, 1986; Larson, 1977) become significantly strengthened 
through government approval of claims of competence by practitioners 
and government opposition to market entry by others with different 
credentials. Where independence of professions from government does 
not exist and professions owe their existence to government, they 
remain largely subject to public authority. Practitioner bodies then 




























































































Governments with a strong tradition of centralized planning and 
control, whether democratic or totalitarian, allocate resources and 
award mandates to professions in accord with their conceptions of 
national objectives. Intolerance of, or at best indifference, to other 
specialties not considered vital, exists in such societies. This can occur 
through political revolutions that wipe out ancien regimes including 
independent professional associations. A new government may establish 
only specialty groups and educational programs deemed useful for, or 
non-threatening to, regime maintenance. Governments of developing 
countries support professions yielding work deemed directly beneficial 
to them or otherwise considered essential in nation-building.
Initiation o f Profession-Public Authority Interactions
In broad terms, interest in profession-public authority exchanges 
focusses on a dual set of questions. The first presume initiation by 
professions while the second presume that public authority initiates such 
occurrences.
The following concern initiation by professions:
— When do professional associations seek to influence the policies 
of public bodies?
— How do professions organize when they undertake such efforts?
— What resources and courses of actions do associations use in 
trying to assure change in public policies?
— Which elements of government institutions become targeted for 
intervention and what proportion become receptive to such 
efforts, or prove resistant to them?
Complementary questions concern initiation by public authority, as 
follows:
— When do public bodies exercise control over professions?
— How do public bodies seek to influence, to limit, or to shape the 
policies and actions of professional groups?
— What aspects of professions or of activities associated with them 
serve as targets for such undertakings?
The most useful and non-parochial approach to such questions 
demands systematic comparison of engagements by diverse kinds of 
structures of both professions and public authority. The economic, 
social, and historical contexts where they occur must also be reviewed. 
Comparisons with interactions between government and other institu­
tions such as unions, employer bodies, industrial organizations, and farm 
groups should be undertaken. While much of this lies beyond this 




























































































approaches: (a) initiation of interaction by profession vs. initiation by 
government; (b) actions undertaken by a single profession vs. coopera­
tion and/or concerted actions by multiple professions; (c) professional 
body subordinate to government vs. autonomy of professional body; (d) 
national arena vs. supra-national arena; (e) national arena vs. interna­
tional arena; (f) action by single component vs. multiple components of 
a profession or professions; and (g) equivalent professions in different 
national settings interacting with public bodies in these settings. Each 
represents differing combinations of institutional characteristics of 
professions, of government, and of their environments that can 
potentially affect the substance and pace of profession-public authority 
exchanges. Other possibilities, not presented above, can also condition 
these. They include alliances as well as cooperative engagements and 
planned simultaneous actions by professions acting jointly with 
organized non-professions, such as industrial or trade unions and 
industrial or commercial federations and associations.
Conclusion
These analyses treat both professions and public authority as variables 
and assume that professions utilize substantial aggregates of human, 
economic, and material resources provided by other institutions within 
the environing society. Individual professions exist in the broadest 
sense on sufferance and claim respect and recognition from others for 
achievements of their practitioners. Their license and mandate (Hughes, 
1973) differs across specializations and across national societies. The 
development of the work of professions, of educational requirements, 
of licensing arrangements, of compensation levels and sources, can only 
be explained through historical and comparative study and now by 
taking into account extra-national systems of public authority and 
the economy.
To assume that territorial boundaries circumscribed by national 
governments necessarily set the limits for analysis of 
government-profession interaction would be arbitrary at best (Philip, 
1983). While national governments and domestic concerns specific to 
each nation have dominated the environments to which professional 
associations must be responsive, international authority and foreign 
systems have mounting significance in the global economy. Their 
importance and influence for professions and governments within 
nations have reached beyond marginal effects. Extra-national institution­




























































































merits within which professions exist, from which they sustain support 
or receive challenges, and toward which they act and react.
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